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EU Declarations of Competence to
Multilateral Agreements: A Useful
Reference Base?
Andrés Delgado CASTELEIRO*
The participation of the European Union alongside its Member States in multilateral
agreements can create situations of uncertainty for third parties. In order to deal with this
uncertainty, the EU makes a declaration stating the extent to which the international agreement
is governed by EU competence. However, these declarations of competence create uncertainty as
regards their legal effects and effectiveness.This article aims to examine these issues by analysing
these declarations from a practical perspective.The first section conceptualizes the declarations, first
by establishing their basic features, second, indentifying their legal effects, and third, by identifying
a list of problems attached to these instruments.The second section focuses on both the internal
and the external practice regarding the declarations of competence.This section highlights how the
increasing tendency of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to rely on the declaration of
competence is not mirrored in the external sphere. In fact, no declaration of competence has ever
been invoked by a third party or used by an international court to apportion the responsibilities
between the EU and its Member States.The third section assesses the overall effectiveness of the
declarations balanced with the problems that they entail.
1 INTRODUCTION
The joint participation of the EU and its Member States in an international
agreement (also known as mixity)1 blurs the extent of the rights and obligations
governed by the agreement.2 The use of this mixed formula can create situations
of uncertainty for third parties since it avoids the question of the division of
competence between the EU and its Member States in the matters governed by
the mixed agreement.3 The desire of third parties to a mixed agreement to know
* Lecturer in EU Law, University of Durham, United Kingdom. PhD, European University Institute,
Florence, Italy. The author would like to thank Professor Marise Cremona for her comments and
suggestions.The usual disclaimer applies.
1 P.J. Kuijper, Of ‘Mixity’ and ‘Double-hatting’. EU External Relations Law Explained (Amsterdam
University Press 2008).
2 Ruling 1/78/EURATOM Nuclear Materials (ECJ, 1978) ECR 2151, para. 35. Cf. C.-D. Ehlermann,
Mixed Agreements A list of Problems, in Mixed Agreements, 3–21 (D. O’Keeffe & H.G Schermers eds.,
Kluwer Law andTaxation 1983).
3 See, R. Schütze, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Mixity as a (Inter)national Phenomenon, in Mixed Agreements
in EU Law Revisited.The EU and its Member States in theWorld, 81 (C. Hillion & P. Koutrakos eds., Hart
Casteleiro,Andrés Delgado. ‘EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful
Reference Base?’. European Foreign Affairs Review 17, no. 4 (2012): 491–510.
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the scope of the competence and the responsibility of the EU and its Member
States has been the driving force behind a specific treaty-making practice
developed by the EU in the framework of multilateral agreements.4 Within these
multilateral conventions, third parties want to know beforehand who is voting (to
avoid a double exercise of voting rights), who is implementing (to ensure
compliance) and who is responsible for a breach of the agreement (even before an
internationally wrongful act has been committed).5 In response to these concerns,
the EU makes a declaration when concluding the mixed agreement delimiting the
extent to which the international agreement falls within EU competence.6 In
other words, declarations of competence are an attempt to apportion the
responsibilities within a multilateral agreement based on who has competence (the
EU and/or its Member States) over the issue covered by the specific provisions of
the multilateral agreement.
These declarations of competence externalize an internal matter (i.e., the
vertical division of competences).7 Moreover, the vertical division of competences
is one of the most complex and debated issues in EU External Relations Law, not
only among scholars,8 but also among the EU institutions.9
Initially, declarations of competence were supported by neither the
Commission10 nor the European Court of Justice (ECJ).11 In their view, the
2010). Cf. J. Groux, The European Communities in the international order, 325 (Commission of the
European Communities, 1985); J. Roldán Barbero, La CEE y el Convenio sobre Derecho del Mar de
1982. : consideraciones sobre la relación entre el Derecho de Comunitario y el Derecho Internacional, Revista de
Instituciones Europeas, 551–583 (1991); J.Temple Lang, The Ozone Layer Convention:A new Solution to
the question of Community participation in ‘Mixed’ International Agreements, 23 CML Rev., 157–176
(1986); J Heliskoski, Mixed agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the
European Community and its Member States (Kluwer Law International 2001).
4 F. Hoffmeister, Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the European Union and its
Member States, in Hillion & Koutrakos eds., supra n. 3, at 259.
5 Kuijper, supra n. 1, at 12.
6 A list of the declarations of competence made by the EU can be found at the European Commission
Treaty Office Database: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/viewCollection.do (accessed Oct. 25,
2011).
7 The vertical division of competences concerns the division of competences between the EU and its
Member States. By contrast, the horizontal division of competences concerns the division of
competence between the different EU institutions. E. Neframi, L’action extérieure de l’Union européenne.
Fondements, moyens, principes, 79 (LGDJ 2010).
8 For a recent and complete overview see P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 11–163 (Oxford
2011); Neframi, supra n. 7, at 21–75; M. Cremona, External Relations and External Competence of the
European Union:The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in The Evolution of EU Law, 217–268 (P. Craig &
G. de Burca eds., 2d ed., Oxford University Press 2010).
9 Some recent examples: ECJ Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR I-03317; ECJ
Opinion 1/08 GATS, [2009] ECR I-11129; ECJ Case C - 45/07, Commission v. Greece (IMO) [2009]
ECR I-00701; ECJ Opinion 1/03 Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR
I-01145.
10 I. Macleod, I. D Hendry & S. Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities : a Manual of
Law and Practice, 325 (Clarendon 1996).
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distribution of competences should have remained an internal issue. However, in
recent years both the Commission and the ECJ have gradually accepted the
possibility of clarifying the internal division of competences to third parties to
mixed agreements. The Commission has learned to recognize that third parties
might require a declaration of competence from the EU so it can conclude the
agreement, and it relies on them when pleading in Luxembourg.12 Moreover, the
ECJ has used them increasingly when interpreting mixed agreements, 13 and when
dealing with complex external competence issues,14 leading the Court to
acknowledge that the declarations of competence constitute ‘a useful reference
base’.15
Despite their gradual acceptance by the ECJ and the Commission,
declarations of competence create uncertainty as regards their legal effects and
effectiveness.This article examines these declarations from a practical perspective.
The first section conceptualizes the declarations, first, by establishing their basic
features, second, by questioning which are their legal effects, and third, by
identifying a list of problems attached to these instruments. The second section
focuses on both the internal and the external practice regarding the declarations of
competence.The section puts forwards some recent developments concerning the
use of the declarations of competence in the ECJ.The third section provides with
a set of conclusions assessing the overall effectiveness of the declarations balanced
with the problems that they entail.
2 DECLARATIONS OF COMPETENCE:AN ATTEMPT AT
CONCEPTUALIZATION
2.1 BASIC FEATURES OF DECLARATIONS OF COMPETENCE
2.1[a] Basic content of the participation clauses which enshrine the obligation of
making a declaration of competence
Declarations of competence are designed to comply with the conditions
established in the participation clause of an international agreement to which the
EU and its Member Sates intend to become parties. In other words, participation
11 Ruling 1/78/EURATOM,Nuclear Materials, supra n. 2.
12 European Commission,Non-Paper, Disconnection Clauses, (in file with the author).
13 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo zivotného prostredia Slovenskej republiky
(LZ), [nyr]; ECJ Case C-459/ 03,Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant) [2006] ECR I-04635.
14 E.g. ECJ Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR I-03317; ECJ C-29/99,
Commission v. Council (Convention on Nuclear Safety) [2002] ECR I-11221; ECJ Case C-94/03,
Commission v. Council (Rotterdam Convention) [2006] ECR I-1; ECJ Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol
[2001] ECR I-09713.
15 MOX Plant, supra n. 13, at para. 109.
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clauses are those provisions of an international agreement establishing the
conditions under which an International Organization (IO) can participate in that
international agreement.16 They do this in two ways. First, the agreement can be
opened to IOs without establishing any condition besides the signature and the
ratification of the agreement. Second, the international agreement may establish
some requisites for the accession of the IO.These requisites are typically due to the
mixed nature of the agreement. For instance, the international agreement might
require the IO to make a statement on the division of powers between the IO and
its Member States (declaration of competences), or on the management of voting
rights.17 Participation clauses requiring a declaration of competence have most
often been used in multilateral conventions which cover issues related to
Environmental Law.18
The existence of a declaration of competence always responds to the exigency
envisaged in an international agreement of clarifying the distribution of
competence between an IO and its Member States. There are no cases in which
the EU (or any other IO) has made a declaration of competence without the
agreement expressly requiring it to do so.
Although it is not explicitly recognized, participation clauses are designed
with the EU and its Member States in mind. Since the United Nations
Convention for the Law Of the Seas (UNCLOS),19 international agreements have
opted to refer to a particular category such as Regional Economic Integration
Organization (hereinafter REIO) instead of a general one like IO or the specific
name of the organization. These provisions establish the general obligation of
declaring the extent of the competence when both the REIO and at least one of
its Member States are parties to the agreement. Some participation clauses also
establish subsidiary mechanisms to ensure that the declaration made by the REIO
answers the question of the division of competences in a quick and trustworthy
way.20 For instance, Annex IX of the UNCLOS establishes, in the first place, the
obligation of making a declaration specifying the matters governed by this Convention in
16 J.J. Feenstra, A Survey of the Mixed Agreements and their Participation Clauses, in O’Keeffe & Schermers
eds., supra n. 2, at 207–248.
17 See Art. 30. 4 iv of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, p. 0021 – 0030 (Dec. 11, 1999), OJ L 318.
18 E.g. Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their
disposal, 0003 – 0022 (1993), OJ. L-039; Cartagena protocol on biosafety to the convention on
biological diversity. Convention on the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and
international lakes, 0044 – 0058 (1995), OJ. L-186; Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents, 0006 – 0033 (1998), OJ. L 326; United Nations Convention to combat
desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, particularly in
Africa, 3-35 (1998), OJ. L 083; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
0013-0028 (1994), OJ. L 033.
19 Temple Lang, supra n. 3, at 157–176.
20 P.J. Kuijper, International Responsibility for EU Mixed Agreements, in Hillion & Koutrakos eds., supra n. 3,
at 225.
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respect of which competence has been transferred to the organization by its member States
which are Parties to this Convention (Article 5.1). In addition, the UNCLOS
envisages a mechanism to force compliance with the obligation of making a
declaration of competence.21 Article 6 of Annex IX establishes that if the REIO
and its Member States fail to provide clarification on the division of competence
on a certain issue they will be subjected to joint and several liability.
The importance of a subsidiary mechanism such as this must not be
overlooked. It is a good way to encourage the REIO and its Member States to
clearly establish the distribution of competences.Thus, if they do not comply with
this provision, the uncertainty over responsibility for implementation leads to joint
liability of the REIO and its Member States.22
2.1[b] Common Formal Structure of Declarations of Competence
Despite the freedom given by participation clauses to REIOs on how to report
their competences on matters related to the international agreement, the EU has
developed a standard practice. All declarations of competence have a similar basic
structure. First, declarations often begin by signalling the existence of an EU
competence on the issue. For example, the declaration made pursuant to the
Convention on Biological Diversity reads: In accordance with the relevant provisions of
the [TFEU], the [Union] alongside its Member States has competence to take actions
aiming at the protection of the environment. In this first part, the declaration does not
evaluate the nature of the competence; it simply signals its existence.
Second, the declaration explains the aspects of the international agreement
covered by the EU competence. Depending on the declaration, this part will take a
different shape.The declaration can determine the existence of EU’s competence
by linking it to the existence of EU legislation on issues covered by the
international agreement.23 It can also acknowledge the existence of EU´s
competence on general subject-matters like environment protection or trade in
21 P.J. Kuijper & E. Paasivirta, Further Exploring International Responsibility: The European Community and
the ILC’s Project on Responsibility of International Organizations, 1 Int’l. Org. L. Rev. 111–138 (2004).
22 On the issue of joint liability of the EU and its Member States in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements see, A. Nollkaemper, Joint Responsibility between the EU and Member States for
Non-Performance of Obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in The EU and International
Environmental Law (E.Morgera & G.Marín Durán eds., 2012).
23 E.g.Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer, 0021 – 0028 (1988), OJ. L-297.
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goods.24 Declarations can also establish the existence of EU competences by
making reference to both general subjects and EU legislation.25
Finally, some declarations have a clause which signals the dynamic character of
the EU competence.26 For instance, the declaration made to the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities mentions that: ‘The scope and the
exercise of Community competence are by their nature, subject to continuous
development […].’27
2.2 LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE DECLARATIONS OF COMPETENCE
The legal consequences of a declaration of competence may be different in
International Law than in EU Law. From an international point of view, the
question of the legal effects of the declaration relates to the binding force of the
statements made in the declarations towards third parties to the agreement. From
an (internal) EU perspective, the question of legal effects relates to the internal
value of the division of competence made in the declaration. In other words,
internally the main question would be, to what extent can the statement made in a
declaration in relation to a competence affects the development of that specific
competence?
At an international level, it is possible to consider declarations of competence
as one of these instruments made by one party related to the conclusion of the
agreement and accepted by the other parties in the sense of Article 31.2 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.28 This would give them an
interpretative value. In the event of a conflict related to the competence, the
declarations would serve as an interpretative tool.They are an authoritative statement
on the scope of the parties’ commitment under the agreements.29
At the internal level, the issue of the legal effects of the declarations of
competence is relevant to the extent that the declarations could be used to expand
24 E.g. Rotterdam convention on the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals
and pesticides in international trade, 0029 – 0047 (2003), OJ. L-063; Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 0004 – 0020 (2002), OJ. L-130; Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 0050 – 0065 (2002), OJ. L-201.
25 E.g. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 0015 –
0030 (2006) OJ. L-201; Council Decision 2006/719/EC of Oct. 5, 2006 on the accession of the
Community to the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 001 – 0010 (2006), OJ. L- 297.
26 Cf. Declaration by the European Community in accordance with Art. 34(3) of the Cartagena
protocol, supra n. 18.
27 Declaration concerning the competence of the European Community with regard to matters
governed by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (2010) OJ L-
23/55.
28 Macleod, Hendry & Hyett, supra n. 10, at 324.
29 P. Okawa, The European Community and International Environmental Agreements,Yearbook of European
Law, 176 (1995).
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the scope EU competence on a specific issue mentioned in a declaration.30 It is
not clear whether the classification of a competence made in a declaration as
exclusive could determine its exclusiveness internally.31 Strictly speaking,
declarations of competence cannot create new spheres of EU powers. 32 Moreover,
the Court could use them as evidence that a competence has been exercised in a
specific case.33 Consequently, the possibility that declarations have some internal
effects when used as interpretative tools by the ECJ cannot be excluded.34
Therefore, since the Court could refer to the declaration in order to interpret
the agreement in respect to which it was made,35 could a declaration of
competence be challenged in the ECJ? Such a scenario could arise as a
consequence of the different views of the competence to be included in a specific
declaration. This was the case with the Convention on Nuclear Safety (the
Convention).36 The Council made a declaration to this Convention (concluded by
virtue of the EURATOM Treaty) which the Commission considered as
incomplete since it did not include all the competences which fell within the
scope of the Convention.
The Court considered that declarations of competence have legal effects
which flow from their inclusion in the decision that concludes an international
agreement.37 More specifically, the ECJ considered that by not drafting the
declaration as completely as possible, the Council breached its duty of cooperation
towards the Commission.38 An incomplete declaration of competence does not
only run against the interests of the other contracting parties of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety,39 but also against the Union inasmuch as it does not enable it
to fully comply with international law.40
The ECJ considered that declarations of competence have the same legal
effects as the concluding decisions to which they are attached and can therefore be
challenged. Declarations of competence do not have independent legal effects but
rather form part of the concluding decision. Furthermore, by virtue of the duty of
cooperation, EU institutions have a Union obligation to make the most complete
declaration of competence possible. However, the completeness of declarations of
30 N.A.Neuwahl,Mixed Agreements: Analysis of the Phenomenon and their Legal Significance, 89 (EUI 1988).
31 Macleod, Hendry & Hyett, supra n. 10, at 325.
32 Ibid.
33 MOX Plant, supra n. 13, at para. 105. LZ, supra n. 13, at para. 39.
34 Hoffmeister, supra n. 4, at 249–268.
35 P. Koutrakos,The Intepretation of Mixed Agreements, in Hillion & Koutrakos eds., supra n. 3, at 128–129.
36 C-29/99,Commission v. Council (Convention on Nuclear Safety) [2002] ECR I- 11221.
37 Ibid., at para. 40.
38 Ibid., at para. 69.
39 Ibid., at para. 70.
40 Ibid., at para. 71.
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competences is not an easy obligation to comply with, as will be shown in the
next section.
2.3 MAIN PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DECLARATIONS OF COMPETENCE
There are two important points concerning declarations of competence that need
to be analysed: the way in which declarations establish EU competence in relation
to a multilateral agreement, and the question of managing a dynamic system of
competence with an instrument like a declaration attached to an international
agreement.As it was already mentioned, declarations of competence deal with the
vertical division of powers within the European Union.They attempt at clarifying
whether a certain competence lies at the EU level or at the Member State level.
However, competences do not always lie either at the EU level or at the Member
State level.The competence picture is much more complex.
First, the Treaties enshrine different types of competences.41 For instance,
EU´s common commercial policy falls within EU exclusive competence,42 which
means that only the EU can act in that area.43 By contrast, Article 2 TFEU also
establishes that under shared competence the Union and the Member States may
legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, the Member States shall exercise
their shared competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its
competence. For instance, environment and agriculture are examples of shared
competences.44 Yet, there are situations in which it is not clear which kind of
competence the EU has exercised and their precise scope, for example due to the
use of multiple legal bases when adopting the piece of legislation.45
Moreover, different competences can cover the same subject in international
agreements. In Opinion 1/94, the Court recognized that the competence used to
conclude an agreement might be different from the competence needed to
implement it.46 For instance, the WTO Agriculture Agreement was concluded by
virtue of EU´s exclusive competence on common commercial policy. Yet, its
implementation has been done through internal measures adopted under a shared
competence (agriculture).47 Therefore, the fact that the EU might have exclusive
41 Article 2 TFEU.
42 Article 3.1 (e)TFEU.
43 Article 2 TFEU provides that ‘when the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a
specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts’.
44 Article 4.2 (d) and (e)TFEU.
45 Cf. Case C-94/03, Commission v. Council (Rotterdam Convention) [2006] ECR I-1; P. Koutrakos, Legal
Basis and Delimitation of Competence in the EU, in EU Foreign Relations Law, 171–198 (M. Cremona &
B.De Witte eds., Hart 2008).
46 ECJ Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and
the protection of intellectual property [1994] ECR I-05267.
47 Ibid., at para. 29.
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competence to conclude an agreement does not prevent the fact that the
implementation might be done through shared competence, or vice versa.
Second, the dynamic nature of EU’s competence adds another layer of
complexity. Regardless the catalogue of competences in the Lisbon Treaty,48 EU´s
competence is subject to continuous change and evolution.The ERTA doctrine is
the perfect example of the evolutionary nature of the EU´s competence. This
doctrine recognizes the existence of EU powers not explicitly conferred by the
Treaties.49 This doctrine establishes that the competence of the Union to conclude
international agreements may arise not only from an express conferment by the
Treaty, but may also flow implicitly from other provisions of the Treaty and from
measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the EU
institutions.50 This doctrine, now codified in Article 216 TFEU, allows the EU to
conclude international agreements where the conclusion of that ‘agreement is
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one
of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding
Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope’.Therefore, even
though the Treaties do not expressly provide for the possibility of the EU to act in
a certain field, the EU nevertheless might act if, for instance, is necessary to achieve
an EU objective.
Moreover, the conditions under which this implied power becomes exclusive
have also evolved through the case-law of the ECJ. Initially, the Court
acknowledged that the EU had an exclusive external implied power each time the
Union, ‘with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty,
adopts provisions laying down common rules’.51 Nowadays, the Court has
identified three situations under which the Union acquires an external
competence not expressly provided in the Treaties:52 (a) where the international
commitments fall within the scope of the common rules,53 or in any event within
an area which is already largely covered by such rules;54 (b) whenever the Union
has included in its internal legislative acts provisions relating to the treatment of
nationals of non-member countries or expressly conferred on its institutions
48 Articles 3–6 TFEU.
49 See. ECJ Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 0263, para. 16; Cf. M. Cremona,
External Relations and External Competence of the European Union:The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in
The Evolution of EU Law, 217–268 (2d ed., Oxford, 2011); C. Hillion, ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies:
Laying the Grounds of the EU System of External Relations, in The Past and Future of EU Law.The Classics
of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the RomeTreaty, 224–233 (M. Maduro & L.Azoulai eds.,
Hart 2010).
50 Opinion 1/03, supra n. 9, at para. 114.
51 Case 22/70,Commission v. Council (ERTA), supra n. 49, at para. 17.
52 ECJ Case C-476/98, Commission v. Germany (re Open Skies Agreements), [2002] ECR I-9855, para.
108–110.
53 Case 22/70,Commission v. Council (ERTA), supra n. 49, at para. 30.
54 ECJ Opinion 2/91 (Re ILO) [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 25.
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powers to negotiate with non-member countries;55 and (c) where the Union has
achieved complete harmonization in a given area.56 These three situations are now
codified in Article 3.2 TFEU. However, the Court has recognized that these
circumstances under which an implied exclusive power arises are only examples.57
According to the Court, implied exclusive competences could arise under other
circumstances apart from those enshrined in Article 3.2TFEU.
In a nutshell, the system of division of competences is not only subject to
constant change by virtue of the notion of implied powers, but also impacted by
the conditions under which this implied powers arise and the exact scope of the
competence.
2.3[a] How declarations of competence clarify the vertical division of powers in the EU
Therefore, how do declarations of competence explain the vertical division of
competence? In practice, declarations of competence to mixed agreements usually
appear in two scenarios: first, agreements that contain elements falling under both
EU exclusive competence and shared competence; and second, agreements that
only fall under a shared competence. Examples of the former would be the
UNCLOS, the Rotterdam Convention,58 the UNESCO Cultural Diversity
Convention,59 or the Codex Alimentarius.60 The concluding decision of all these
mixed agreements includes an article of exclusive competence and at least one
article of shared competence. In all these agreements, the pertinence of a statement
on the division of competences can be understood to the extent that there are two
different types of competence covering the whole agreement.
Examples of the latter relate mainly to environmental issues61 that are a shared
competence.62 From this point of view, it would not be useful to make a
declaration stating the division of competences, since the EU and its Member
States have shared competence over the subject-matter of the agreement.
55 Opinion 1/94, supra n. 46, at para. 95; ECJ Opinion 2/92 (re: OECD) [1995] ECR I-521, para. 33.
56 Opinion 1/94, supra n. 46, at para. 96;Opinion 2/92, supra n. 55, at para. 33.
57 ECJ Opinion 1/03 (Re Lugano Convention) [2006] ECR I-1145, para. 121.Art. 3.2 TFEU thus provides
with a list of examples of implied exclusive competences.
58 Rotterdam Convention, supra n. 24.
59 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, supra n. 25.
60 Council Decision 2003/822/EC of 17 November 2003 on the accession of the European Community to the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, (2003) OJ L-309/0014 – 0021.
61 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 3–29 (2006) OJ L-209; Cartagena protocol,
supra n. 24; Kyoto Protocol, supra n. 24; Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents, supra n. 15; United Nations Convention to combat desertification, supra n. 18; Convention
on the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes, supra n. 18; United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra n. 18; Convention on Biological Diversity,
0003 – 0020 (1993) OJ L-309; Basel Convention, supra n. 18.
62 L. Krämer,EC Environmental Law, 95 (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2003).
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For instance, the declaration of competence made to the Aarhus
Convention63 starts by acknowledging the external competence of the EU to
enter into environmental agreements. Then the declaration quotes the four
objectives laid down in Article 191.1 TFEU. However, to what extent does listing
the EU objectives in the environmental field help third parties understand whether
a particular provision of the Aarhus Convention is to be implemented by the EU
or by its Member States? First, environment is shared competence, and, by virtue
of Article 2.2 TFEU, ‘Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent
that the Union has not exercised its competence.’ The objectives envisaged in
Article 191 are not to be interpreted in a preemptive way.64 In other words, the
mention of an objective envisaged in the TFEU does not mean that the EU has
sole competence over them. Second, this declaration fails to clarify the division of
competence to the extent that it does not even state the nature of the competence.
The only indication that third parties receive as to the matters for which the EU
responsible is through a clause which explains the doctrine of preemption: The
European [Union] is responsible for the performance of those obligations resulting from the
Convention which are covered by [Union] law in force.65
Furthermore, in some declarations the EU establishes its competence through
reference to pieces of legislation and policy documents, such as Commission
Communications. In the declaration to the UN Convention to combat
desertification, apart from a list of EU legislation, one of the general instruments
mentioned is a Communication on development cooperation.66 It suffices to say
that Commission Communications do not have any legal nature whatsoever. In
the Climate Change Convention, the EU included in the list environmental
programmes.67 This reference to policy documents as way to establish the division
of competences may mislead third parties on where the competence stands on a
particular issue.
63 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of Feb. 17, 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and
access to justice in environmental matters, 3 (2005), OJ L 124.
64 Krämer, supra n. 62, at 8.
65 This clause is also envisaged, inter alia, in the Declarations to the Stockholm Convention, the
Cartagena Protocol, and the Rotterdam Convention.
66 Communication form the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament concerning
development cooperation policy in run-up to 2000, SEC (92) 915 final.
67 Council Decision 89/625 EEC of Nov. 20, 1989 on European Programme on Science and
Technology for Environment Protection, and a European Programme on Climatology and Natural
Hazards (EPOCH), (1989) OJ L 369.
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2.3[b] Managing a dynamic system of competences with a static instrument
Apart from explaining the vertical division of competences within the EU,
declarations of competence also try to clarify how EU competences evolve. The
EU’s system of competence is still open to new developments. The ERTA
principle is a paradigmatic example of the dynamic character of the EU
competence.68
The final clause of some declarations of competence acknowledges the
continuous development to which the EU competence is subject. Yet, the
declaration does not help third parties to the agreement.The participation clause,
apart from demanding a declaration stating the division of competences between
the EU and its Member States, imposes an obligation to make substantial changes
known.69 Taking that into account, such final clauses could be seen as a way of
avoiding the obligation of updating the declarations.
The dynamic character of EU competence imposes on the EU the obligation
of keeping declarations up to date. This obligation might be seen as a fairly
straightforward task. However, declarations have never been updated.This becomes
especially problematic in those declarations which establish EU competence
through a list of EU legislation. For example, in the Convention on Climate
Change, from a total of eleven norms, only one remains in force,70 while in the
UN Convention to combat desertification none of the legal norms cited is in
force, only the political documents remaining ‘in force’.71 This lack of update
creates uncertainty on the existence of EU competence to the extent that a
specific norm cited may not still be in force. Furthermore, the lack of update of
the declarations also means that new legislation is not included in the declarations.
Therefore, declarations of competence which makes reference to legislation do not
only misinform third parties, they are also incomplete.
Overall, these problems show the extent to which declarations of competence
fail to clarify the division of competence for the benefit of third parties to
multilateral (mixed) agreements. In addition, they fail to provide a complete
answer to the question of EU competences on the matters governed by the
68 See supra sec. 2.3.
69 See Art. 44.1 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
70 Council Directive 92/6/EEC of Feb. 10, 1992 on the installation and use of speed limitation devices
for certain categories of motor vehicles in the Community, 27–28 (1992), OJ L-57.
71 Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
meeting within the Council of Feb. 1, 1993 on a Community programme of policy and action in
relation to the environment and sustainable development, 1 (1993) OJ C-138; Communication from
the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament concerning development
cooperation policy in the run-up to 2000, SEC(92) 915 final; Commission communication in
accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1973/92 of May 21, 1992 establishing a financial
instrument for the environment (LIFE), relating to priority actions to be implemented in 1995, 3
(1994) OJ C 139.
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agreement. These declarations externalize not only the internal division of
competences, but also the problems and questions attached to the vertical division
of powers in the EU.
3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE DECLARATIONS OF
COMPETENCE
By analysing existing practice on the issue, it will be possible to test the relevance
and usefulness of the declarations as a way of helping third parties understand EU
internal division of competences concerning a multilateral agreement.This section
examines the most recent practice concerning the declaration. Interestingly,
although declarations of competence are designed in order to be applied externally
they are also being applied increasingly internally.72 More and more the ECJ uses
these instruments to deal with internal discussions on the vertical division of
powers within mixed agreements. There is thus the possibility of diverging (and
conflicting) interpretations internally and externally. Moreover, this divergence
could negatively affect the EU as an international actor.Third parties to a mixed
agreement and international courts interpreting those agreements could read the
declaration in a completely different way than the reading given by the ECJ. On
one hand, an international court could acknowledge Member States´ external
competence (and responsibility) on a certain issue of a mixed agreement; while, on
the other hand, the ECJ could recognize EU´s external competence (and
responsibility) on the same issue. Furthermore, these conflicting readings of a
declaration of competence could not only endanger EU´s compliance with its
obligations under a mixed agreement, but also Member States´ compliance with
EU Law.
In recent years, declarations of competence have increasingly been invoked in
front of the ECJ. Initially, the Court embraced them as a useful reference base. Yet,
the Court’s use of declarations is not as consistent as it might be expected. In this
regard, two recent cases show how declarations of competence have played an
important role in the internal discussion about the vertical division of competence
while, at the same time, show the different approaches that the Court has taken to
deal with declarations of competence.
3.1 A USEFUL REFERENCE BASE: THE MOX PLANT CASE
In the MOX Plant case, the Court used the declaration of competence made
pursuant to UNCLOS to establish its jurisdiction. Moreover, this case constitutes
72 See supra nn. 10 and 11.
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an interesting example since it shows how the declaration of competence on
UNCLOS was used in the framework of a case before the ECJ, while it was not
mentioned in the international legal proceedings which gave rise to the action at
the ECJ.73
In this case, Ireland brought an action UNCLOS against the United Kingdom
concerning the operation of a MOX Plant in Sellafield. As mentioned above,
UNCLOS is mixed agreements with an attached declaration of competence. As a
consequence of this action, the Commission brought an infringement action
against Ireland. It was the Commission’s understanding that by instituting
dispute-settlement proceedings against the UK under the UNCLOS concerning
the MOX plant, Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 344 (ex
Article 292) TFEU (ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction) and 4.3 (ex Article 10 TEC)
TEU (the duty of sincere cooperation).74
According to settled case-law, ECJ’s jurisdiction over mixed agreements
extends not only to those provisions of the agreement falling within the EU’s
exclusive competence but also to those which are covered by shared with the
Member States.75 Therefore, it seems logical for both parties to rely on the
declaration of competence in order to make their point on the existence, or lack,
of an EU competence.76 Likewise,AG Maduro referred to the declaration in order
to establish the jurisdiction of the Court, while pointing out its lack of clarity and
elegance.77
Logically, since both parties and the Advocate General had used the
declaration of competence to shed some light on the issue of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court, so did the ECJ. According to it, the declaration
confirmed that a transfer of shared competence, in particular in regard to the
prevention of marine pollution, took place within the framework of the Convention within
the terms of the ERTA judgment.78 Furthermore, the ECJ held that within the
specific context of the Convention, a finding that there has been a transfer to the [Union] of
73 For a more detailed analysis see A. Delgado Casteleiro, The International Responsibility of the European
Union: From competence to normative control, 149–161 (EUI, 2011).
74 Case C-459/ 03,Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), para. 1.
75 Case C-240/09 LZ, supra n. 13; ECJ Case C-431/05, Merck Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos, [2007]
ECR I-7001; ECJ Case C-13/00, Ireland v. Commission (Berne Convention) [2002] ECR I-2953; ECJ
Case C 53/96 Hermès [1998] ECR I-3603; ECJ Case C-300/98 & C-392/98 Dior and Others [2000]
ECR I-11307. Cf. S. Mardsen, Invoking Direct Application and Effect of International Treaties by the
European Court of Justice: Implications for International Environmental Law in the European Union, 60 Int’l.
& Comp. L. Q. 750 (2011); A. Nollkaemper, Joint Responsibility between the EU and Member States for
Non-Performance of Obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in The EU and International
Environmental Law, 27 (E. Morgera & G. Marín Durán eds., Cambridge University Press,
Forthcoming).
76 Case C-459/ 03,Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), paras. 64-67.
77 Ibid., Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, at para. 36.
78 Ibid., at para. 105.
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areas of shared competence is contingent on the existence of[Union] rules within the areas
covered by the Convention provisions in issue, irrespective of what may otherwise be the scope
and nature of those rules.79 Therefore, insofar as there is Union legislation on an area
covered by the UNCLOS, that area falls within Union competence, whether
exclusive or shared, and the ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Leaving aside the issue of whether this particular analysis is the best way to
reach a conclusion on the jurisdiction of the Court,80 the ECJ’s approach
illustrates some of the main questions identified in previous pages.The discussion
about the interpretation of the declaration regarding the nature of the competence
on the protection of environment casts much doubt over the legal certainty that a
declaration must provide to third parties.81 If Ireland and the EU Institutions do
not agree on what the declaration says about the distribution of competences, it is
difficult to expect that from third parties to mixed agreement.The MOX Plant case
shows on one hand, as AG Maduro said the lack of certainty of declarations of
competence. On the other hand, the case shows ECJ’s eagerness to use the
declaration of competence in order to deal with complex issues concerning
the vertical division of competence in the EU and some of the issues (like the
jurisdiction of the Court) liked to it.
3.2 THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE DECLARATION OF COMPETENCE? THE LZ CASE
The approach towards the declaration of competence made to UNCLOS adopted
by the ECJ in the MOX Plant case contrasts with the approach that it took to the
declaration of competence made to the Aarhus Convention in the Lesoochranárske
zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo zivotného prostredia Slovenskej republiky case (hereafter
LZ case). 82
The case concerns a preliminary reference made by the Slovak Supreme
Court on the direct effect of Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention. Article 9.3 of
the Aahus convention provides, inter alia, that each Party shall ensure that, […]
members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts
and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its
national law relating to the environment. Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK (LZ), an
environmental association, argued that by not allowing it to participate in various
79 Ibid., at para. 108.
80 For a critical analysis of the approach developed by the ECJ in relation to the division of
competences, see M. Cremona, Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and
Compliance, in EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals (M. Cremona & B De Witte, Hart
2008); Koutrakos, supra n. 35.
81 R. Churchill & J. Scott, The Mox Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life, 53 Int’l. & Comp. L. Q. 666
(2004).
82 Case C-240/09 LZ, supra n. 13.
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administrative procedures on the granting of permissions to hunt brown bears, the
Slovak Republic had breached Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention. Given the
fact that the Aarhus Convention was a mixed agreement, the question of the ECJ’s
jurisdiction on Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention was raised during the
proceedings.
According to the declaration of competence, the legal instruments in force do not
cover fully the implementation of the obligations resulting from Article 9(3) of the
Convention as they relate to administrative and judicial procedures to challenge acts and
omissions by private persons and public authorities other than the institutions of the
European [Union] […] and that, consequently, its Member States are responsible for the
performance of these obligations at the time of approval of the Convention by the European
[Union] and will remain so unless and until the [Union], in the exercise of its powers under
the [Treaties], adopts provisions of [Union] law covering the implementation of those
obligations.83 In other words, Member States retain their competence (and
resposibility) to ensure that members of the public have access to their national
procedures on environmental issues. The declaration thus establishes a sort of
parallel competence on issues having to do with Article 9.3: the EU is responsible
for making sure that EU insitutions comply with this provision;84 while the
Member States are responsible for making sure that their national institutions
comply with this provision.85 Therefore in a scenario like the LZ case, the ECJ
would not have jurisdiction over the issue, since the EU has no competence on
the issue.
AG Sharpston shared this view in her Opinion,86 arguing that the declaration
was of crucial importance to establish the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthemore,
according to the AG, the obligations at stake in the case (i.e., the obligation to
allow LZ to intervene in a national procedure on hunting licenses) were not
within the sphere that lies within the scope of EU Law.87 While Sharpston was
following the Court’s use of the declaration of competence in the MOX Plant
case, the Court slightly departed from its previous approach. Like in the MOX
Plant case,88 the Court continued to link its jurisdiction to the exercise of
83 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of Feb. 17, 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and
access to justice in environmental matters, 3 (2005) OJ L-124.
84 The Union has transposed that obligation in Regulation 1367/2006 OJ 2006 the European
Parliament and of the Council of Sept. 6, 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, L 264, 25, 13–19.
85 Cf. Case C-240/09 LZ., supra n. 13, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para. 77.
86 Ibid., at para. 78.
87 Ibid., at para. 79.
88 Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), supra n. 13, at para. 108.
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competence by the EU.89 Though, unnlike in the MOX Plant case, the Court
dismissed what the declaration of competence said regarding Article 9.3, and the
view of AG Sharpston on the declaration. The declaration made to the Aarhus
Convention was not a useful reference base. Instead of engaging with the
discussion on the intepration of the declaration of competence, the Court took a
broader view basing its jurisdiction on the explicit external competence on
environmental issues90 and the exercise of an internal shared competence on the
protection of certain species.91
The Court’s reading (or lack of it) of the declaration of competence in the
LZ case could create problems as the participation of the EU and its Member
States in the Aarhus Convention.According to the Court,Article 9.3 of the Aarhus
Convention falls within the scope of EU Law since it relates to a field covered in
large measure covered by it.92
In other words, the Court seems to be arguing that Article 9.3 of the Aarhus
Convention falls within EU’s exclusive competence, 93 even though the
declaration of competence provides that unless the Union has adopted legislation
on that specific issue, Member States retain their competence on Article 9.3.
According to the Court, Member States seems to be no longer competent on
issues covered by Article 9.3.
Nevertheless, the EU has yet to adopt legislation implementing Article 9.3 in
relation to national procedures. Consequently, according to the declaration
Member States are responsible for issues covered by EU’s exclusive competence.
There can be a scenario in which a Member State could bear international
responsibility for the breach of Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention, but could
not implement the decision since it is no longer competent to implement Article
9.3 of the Aarhus Convention.This scenario does not seem too hypothetical since
in 2011 EU’s compliance with Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention was
examined by the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention,94 and made
a similar reading of the declaration of competence than the one made by AG
Sharpston.95 Consequently, ECJ’s interpretation of the declaration of competence
made to the Aarhus Convention could endanger EU’s image within the Aarhus
Convention bodies.
89 Case C-240/09 LZ, supra n. 13, at para. 32.
90 Ibid., at para. 35.
91 Mardsen, supra n. 75, at 755.
92 Case C-240/09 LZ, supra n. 13, at para. 40.
93 Cf.Opinion 1/03, supra n. 9, at para. 121; Cf. Eeckhout, supra n. 9, at 108.
94 Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I)
concerning compliance by the European Union, Report of the Compliance Committee, (Apr. 14,
2011), ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1.
95 Ibid., at para. 58.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
In theory, declarations of competence are supposed to give legal certainty to
non-EU parties to mixed agreements with regard to where responsibilities reside.
By externalizing the internal division of competence, the declarations of
competence give an a priori solution to the questions of implementation and
compliance with mixed agreements. They also provide legal certainty to third
parties that neither the EU nor its Member States will try to avoid their
responsibility in case of a breach by hiding behind the other.This is even clearer in
those agreements in which the REIO clause establishes the joint and several
responsibility of the REIO and its Member State as a subsidiary mechanism to the
declaration of competence. In such agreements, if neither the EU nor a Member
State provides an answer as to who is responsible, both will have to answer for
their silence on the issue.96
Although in theory, declarations could provide an easy solution to the
different responsibility scenarios which were identified in the introduction, a closer
look suggests otherwise. First, the internal division of competence is anything but
simple. Competences do not only change over time, but also vary depending on
the stage of the life-cycle of the agreement (e.g., negotiation, conclusion or
implementation). Second, it appears that declarations create more problems than
they solve. In terms of content, they are vague and fail really to clarify when the
EU is responsible under each specific mixed agreement.97 As Olson argues:
Declarations are not a particularly useful document from the point of view of the EU’s
Treaty partners. Declarations rarely, if ever, include something which would be far more
informative: an article-by-article […] analysis informing treaty partners clearly and in detail
which entity will be exercising which rights and performing which obligations.98
Moreover, they need to be constantly updated so as to keep up with the
evolution of the EU’s powers, but they are not.99 Consequently, after close
examination, it is clear that declarations of competence do not answer the question
of EU competence to implement mixed agreements but instead create more
uncertainty. For instance, what are the legal effects of a declaration which carries
outdated legislation?
In addition, there is little international practice in this area. This lack of
visibility, which might imply disregard for this technique, contrasts with the
increasing relevance that this instrument has internally. The MOX Plant dispute
96 Cf. Heliskoski, supra n. 3.
97 B. De Witte, Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations?, in Cremona & De
Witte, supra n. 45, at 15.
98 Peter M Olson, Mixity from the Outside: the Perspective of a Treaty Partner, in Hillion & Koutrakos eds.,
supra n. 3, at 345.
99 Hoffmeister, supra n. 4, at 259.
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perfectly exemplifies this contradiction. In the international dispute, the
declarations were not mentioned at all by any of the parties. On the contrary in
the case before the ECJ, the parties relied on it in order to establish the division of
competence over the issue.Their insistence on the internal use of the declaration
does not follow the implicit rationale of legal certainty. On the contrary, it
questions it. Given the contradictory interpretations of the declaration pleaded in
the case, it is doubtful that a third party could understand how the internal
division of competence over a specific issue works.Therefore, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to use the declaration in order to apportion the obligations
between the EU and its Member States over a particular issue in an agreement, in
order to understand who is responsible for that part of the agreement.
Having established that declarations of competence as they stand today do not
provide legal certainty to third parties, one question arises: is there any other way
that the EU and its Member States could provide legal certainty to the other
parties to multilateral (mixed) agreements? First, the EU and its Member States
should make a special effort during the negotiations of multilateral conventions to
assure the other parties that the division of competence is an internal issue that
does not affect their compliance with the multilateral convention.100 Most of the
time, the obligation to make a declaration of competence is the result of the lack
of effective coordination between the EU and its Member States during the
negotiation of the agreement.101 Therefore, most of the problems that the
declarations of competence create could be avoided if the EU effectively spoke
with one voice during the negotiations of a multilateral convention. Declarations
of competence seem to be the price to pay for the lack of coordination during the
negotiations.
Second, instead of trying to clarify the complexities surrounding the internal
division of competence and its dynamic nature, the EU should stress in its
declarations made to international agreements not the fact that it has competence
over an issue, but that presented with a situation in which contracting parties may
demand such clarification, the EU will promptly give an univocal response.
Perhaps, by laying down clear procedures in the declaration in which a third party
can obtain clarification on a particular aspect of the division of competence
regarding the agreement, third parties’ legal certainty would be effectively
safeguarded.
100 Kuijper, supra n. 17, at 225.
101 Cf. C. Rijken & V. Kronenberger, The United nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime
and The European Union, in The EU and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony?, 481–517
(V. Kronenberger ed.,T.M.C.Asser Press 2001).
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